After Paris, Western countries and their allies are trying to figure out how to eliminate Islamic State (IS) movement. Unfortunately, there are confused about the problem and subsequently, there are flaws in their strategy.
Western countries see IS as a problem caused by Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad. Western logic goes like this: In the midst of the Arab Spring, Syrians wanted democracy and so they rebelled against President Assad. And then IS, a free rider, infiltrated the rebellion with its own agenda. Accordingly, the solution is very simple: Assad must go, period. But we should ask: Is this true?
First, a disturbing fact is that Western allies, namely Turkey and the Gulf countries, put their weight behind the rebels. But embarrassingly, they themselves are not democratic countries.
To some extent, Turkey is not democratic because it regularly suppresses media freedom. And Turkey has also acted unfairly toward the Kurds and has never accepted them as a part of the nation. And the Gulf countries, most especially Saudi Arabia, know nothing about democracy, and yet they presumed to get involved in a democratic rebellion in Syria. This is the pot calling the kettle black.
Second, IS didn’t come out of thin air and strengthen its position without outside help. Former British prime minister Tony Blair has publicly acknowledged that the war in Iraq helped create IS. Turkey and the Gulf nations helped to arm the Syrian rebels. What we don’t know is whether the rebels they raised included IS factions. We have known for a long time that Saudi Arabia finances Salafist movements and it is Salafist Muslims, alongside disaffected Sunnis in Iraq and Syria, who form the backbone of IS.
If you look at the map, you will see that the only safe way for foreigners to join IS is through Turkey. When three British teenagers left London to join IS, they flew to Turkey. These facts must be acknowledged before developing any strategy to fight IS. Unfortunately, Western powers overlook these facts to keep these allies on their side.
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